



Director of  
Central  
Intelligence

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# National Intelligence Daily

*Monday*  
*31 January 1983*

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
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## EL SALVADOR: Heavy Fighting

*Government troops are making slow progress in northern Morazan Department against stiff guerrilla resistance, but insurgent attacks elsewhere are increasing.* [redacted]

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Salvadoran Army units have crossed the Torola River and retaken the key town of Meanguera and neighboring villages. This northward advance is part of an encirclement that includes other forces moving from the east and west. The Honduran Government has loaned at least eight helicopters and crews to El Salvador for this operation, but there is no information to support guerrilla claims that Honduran infantry units have intervened from the north. [redacted]

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[redacted] The major city of Usulután came under attack over the weekend, following recent guerrilla occupations of several other towns of the southeast. [redacted] recent guerrilla sabotage of one of two bridges over the Lempa River has seriously curtailed vehicular traffic on the southernmost span. [redacted]

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Comment: The increased fighting in Morazan underscores the important military and political test the renewed battle there represents for both sides. Since October operations by guerrilla factions throughout the country have reflected increased determination and efforts to improve cooperation, coordination, and logistics. This, combined with continued political turbulence within the officer corps and civilian government, makes the Army's campaign in Morazan one of the most difficult and important of the counterinsurgency. [redacted]

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## CANADA: Strike of Public Employees in Quebec

*Premier Levesque's separatist government in Quebec probably will be able to deal with the current massive illegal strike in the public sector.*

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Union leaders expect that by tomorrow 250,000 of Quebec's 325,000 public employees will be on strike. Teachers and government lawyers are striking, and most other union workers, including hospital workers but not nurses, will join today--although essential medical services are to be maintained. Nonunion workers and a few smaller unions are not expected to join the job action.

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Comment: The employees oppose provincial legislation that freezes their wages, imposes three-month wage cuts on many, reduces job security, and outlaws strikes for three years. The provincial government took these steps to reduce its soaring deficit after years of generosity toward the public sector.

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The unions lack the funds to support the workers for long, and Levesque is taking legal steps--including the levying of substantial fines--against the unions and individual members. Ultimately, the government could decertify striking unions.

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The strike is deepening divisions among Quebec nationalists, however

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At least two local party organizations already have voted to criticize the government's position.

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## INTERNATIONAL: UN-Backed Disarmament Session

*The 40-member Committee on Disarmament begins a 12-week session at Geneva tomorrow, with strong interest being shown in negotiating a chemical weapons ban and a comprehensive nuclear test ban.* [redacted]

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A West German official says West European governments facing domestic opposition to INF deployment want the appearance of progress on a chemical weapons ban.

[redacted]

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Existing chemical weapons working groups, already in session for two weeks, have been concentrating on technical subjects and international verification, but the Soviets have not indicated any new flexibility on on-site inspection. [redacted]

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Comment: The Soviets may use the Committee to direct propaganda at public opinion in Western Europe, especially West Germany. They may make minor alterations to their chemical weapons draft treaty and other existing proposals, in order to regain support from Nonaligned states that last summer shared Western concerns on verification and compliance. [redacted]

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The Nonaligned will propose that groups be formed to discuss preventing nuclear war and outer space arms control and generally will concentrate on proposals that focus on the major powers and conceal their own disarray. The nuclear test ban issue will present the greatest challenge to Western unity, if the US is alone in opposition to a negotiating mandate. [redacted]

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
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## USSR: Oil Production



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## USSR: Oil Production in 1982

*Oil production in the USSR increased less than 1 percent from 1981 to 1982 and fell slightly below the official target.* [redacted]

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The USSR reported that production of oil and gas condensate during 1982 was 613 million metric tons, or 12.26 million barrels per day. This is slightly less than the planned goal of 614 million metric tons but a 4-million-ton increase over last year. [redacted]

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Production in West Siberia reached 354 million tons, a 20-million-ton increase over 1981. Production outside West Siberia declined by 16 million tons. [redacted]

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Comment: [redacted]

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With an annual production increase of less than 1 percent for the second year in a row, however, oil production has nearly reached a plateau. The Soviets themselves do not believe that they can sustain the record daily production rates achieved in the last quarter of 1982. The plan for this year calls for production of 619 million tons, or a daily rate of 12.38 million barrels. [redacted]

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Soviet hopes for continued production increases hinge primarily on continued growth in West Siberia, where an increase of 18 million metric tons is planned for this year. The Soviets also have to reduce the annual decline in regions outside West Siberia from 15 and 16 million tons respectively over the past two years to the planned level of 12 million tons if they are to meet their production goals for this year. [redacted]

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## TURKEY: Demands To Lower Transit Fees

*Turkey is under increasing diplomatic pressure from several signatories of the Montreux Convention to discuss a new transit fee rate formula.* [redacted]

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Five of the 11 signatory countries to the Montreux Convention, including the three that are members of the Warsaw Pact, have formally protested the Turks' tenfold fee increase for merchant ship transits of the Bosphorus. A Turkish official has advised the US that Ankara is studying these protests and will take no action against Soviet ships for nonpayment of fees until the review is complete. [redacted]

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The official indicated that all those protesting have formally acknowledged the need for some increase in transit fees to compensate the Turks for the services they provide in the Straits. [redacted]

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Comment: The USSR, Romania, and Bulgaria are urging other signers of the Convention to join the protest and put more pressure on Turkey--a veiled threat to call a conference to revise the Convention. Ankara repeatedly has indicated it will attempt to avoid such a conference. [redacted]

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The size of the protest is causing Turkey to re-think its strategy. Ankara probably will now try to persuade other signatories to join in an informal agreement on a new formula and procedures for assessing fees without opening up the entire Convention to international review. [redacted]

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## CANADA: Tories To Hold Leadership Convention

Progressive Conservative leader Joe Clark has called for a party leadership convention because of his failure to receive an overwhelming vote of confidence at the biennial Tory convention. Although he received 66 per cent of the ballots cast, far more than the simple plurality required to retain leadership, Clark said he or any other leader would need a "much clearer mandate" if the party is to form Canada's next government. He announced his intention to resign his positions as party leader and parliamentary opposition leader to stand as an unencumbered candidate for the leadership. [REDACTED]

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Comment: The Tories' failure to give greater support to Clark comes at a time when they enjoy a 17-point lead in the polls over Prime Minister Trudeau's Liberal government, and it underscores their reputation for destructive intraparty fractiousness. The decision to hold a leadership convention will detract from the party's ability to portray itself as a cohesive unit ready to govern the country and will allow the Liberals a breathing space to repair their tattered popularity. The Liberals' national director has indicated that the coming Tory leadership battle may induce Trudeau to reconsider his decision to resign as Liberal leader before the next general election. [REDACTED]

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## MOZAMBIQUE: Efforts To Block Western Ties

The US Embassy in Maputo reports that recent moves against Westerners in Mozambique may have been instigated by Soviet-backed hardliners in the regime who want to obstruct President Machel's efforts to expand ties with the West. Several Portuguese and one British national have been arrested and a Portuguese diplomat expelled on charges of involvement in antigovernment activities in the key port city of Beira. Belgians in Beira reportedly have been harassed by the police and prevented from leaving the city by a "Soviet official" of Mozambique's airline. Elsewhere, military units near Maputo have summarily executed seven alleged members of the South African - backed insurgent group that operates in much of the country. [REDACTED]

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Comment: Moscow clearly is uneasy over Machel's improving relations with the US and West European countries. The public executions also may serve to discourage Western involvement in Mozambique. Although the executions may have been urged by the hardliners, they probably were endorsed by most officials, who are increasingly distressed about the widening insurgency. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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
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**Southern African Development Coordination Conference Members**



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## SOUTHERN AFRICA: Results of Economic Conference

Political and security concerns set the tone for the annual meeting of leaders of nine black African states comprising the Southern African Development Coordination Conference that concluded Friday in Maseru, Lesotho. A communique noted that South African "interference" was a key impediment to the organization's aim of reducing the nine countries' economic dependence on Pretoria. The member countries' vulnerability to such interference was demonstrated just before the opening of the conference when a series of explosions--for which the South African - backed Lesotho Liberation Army claimed credit--damaged a water reservoir in Maseru. Representatives of 29 donor countries and numerous international organizations attended the meeting, pledging support for agricultural, industrial, transport, and other projects to foster regional development. [redacted]

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Comment: Even with increased international aid, the nine states are unlikely to move significantly away from dependence on South Africa in the foreseeable future. Pretoria is likely to continue its efforts to keep neighboring states unstable and economically dependent as long as they support anti - South African insurgents. Nonetheless, most will view with caution proposals that would further politicize or even militarize the economic grouping, such as a recent suggestion by Zimbabwean Prime Minister Mugabe to create a regional defense force under the organization. [redacted]

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## VIETNAM-KAMPUCHEA: Dry Season Operations

Vietnamese forces have been less aggressive through the first half of the dry season than they were last year. The most intense fighting has been near Nong Chan, where forces of the Khmer People's National Liberation Front were forced on 16 January to abandon several new forward positions. The Vietnamese last week added a new regiment near Nong Chan, increasing their strength there to more than a division. They also overran a Democratic Kampuchean base northwest of Pailin and forced evacuation of a small non-Communist base at O Bok and then withdrew.

[redacted]

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Comment: The Vietnamese are in their strongest strategic position since they invaded Kampuchea four years ago. They have moved substantial numbers of troops, armor, and heavy artillery near major resistance bases. Although Hanoi appears satisfied for now to keep guerrilla forces on the defensive, its forces can mount major operations on short notice.

[redacted]

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## Special Analysis

### SYRIA-USSR: Syrian Views on Soviet Support

*President Assad apparently calculates the benefits outweigh the drawbacks for him in the recent deployment to Syria of Soviet SA-5s and related advanced equipment. It is not known what compensation the USSR expects to receive from Syria, but some military and political concessions almost certainly are being sought by Moscow. Damascus, however, is not likely to give Moscow any permanent bases or a decisive role in military planning.* [redacted]

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The Syrians will portray the deliveries of Soviet equipment as efforts to correct the weaknesses exposed during the war in Lebanon. Damascus, however, will publicly avoid putting the deliveries in the context of US-Soviet competition. The Syrians know the SA-5 deployments give Moscow the potential for making new political gains in regional affairs. [redacted]

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In fact, the Soviets have exploited Syria's fear of standing alone against Israel to develop a close bilateral relationship. The US Embassy in Damascus believes Assad has concluded that Tel Aviv is increasingly willing to use its military power and that renewed fighting with Israel is inevitable--perhaps as early as this spring. [redacted]

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### Incentives for Close Ties

Israel's de facto annexation of the Golan Heights in December 1981, together with US political and military support for Tel Aviv, reinforce Syria's need for Soviet support. Syria's sense of regional isolation and its belief it is under military threat are fed by hardline Israeli positions on withdrawal from Lebanon and the West Bank, indications that Jordan and the Palestinians are moving toward participation in the peace process without consulting Syria, and continuing strained relations with Iraq. [redacted]

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The military supply relationship is the most important aspect of Soviet-Syrian ties. Assad needs the appearance of strong Soviet backing to pose a credible military threat to Israel, assert a leadership role in the Arab world, and ensure Syria's eventual inclusion in any comprehensive peace negotiations. In addition, he wants to give his military a continuing flow of advanced weapons, which only the USSR is ready to provide.

[redacted]

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#### The Price of Soviet Support

In return for Moscow's assistance, Damascus has long provided the Soviets a political and military foothold in the Middle East. On the political front, the Syrians have refused to condemn the invasion of Afghanistan. Syrian political maneuvers in Arab forums to broaden the peace process under UN auspices are aimed in part at providing an opening for an increased Soviet role, thereby offsetting US backing for Israel.

[redacted]

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The Syrians permit the Soviets to perform routine maintenance on diesel-powered submarines at Tartus, and Soviet ships call regularly for provisioning at both Tartus and Latakia. Moscow probably is pressuring Syria to provide greater access to military facilities. Assad is likely to make minor concessions, including increased Soviet access to onshore port facilities, regular use of Syrian airfields for reconnaissance missions against the US Sixth Fleet, and the expansion of communications facilities.

[redacted]

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The President, however, almost certainly would be cautious about granting the Soviets formal basing rights. A Soviet presence that calls for surrender of Syrian sovereignty or invites Soviet veto power over Syria's strategic planning would be unacceptable to Assad's key constituency, the military.

[redacted]

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The Soviets' operational control of the SA-5 sites gives the USSR a larger role in Syrian military planning. The extent of Soviet influence, however, is uncertain.

[redacted]

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A visible enlarged Soviet presence risks inciting Assad's conservative Islamic opponents at home and could prompt an increase in terrorist attacks on Soviet personnel and installations. Moreover, concessions to the USSR strain Syria's relations with Saudi Arabia and other important financial supporters. The moderate Arab states will react negatively to anything that appears to subordinate their interests to those of Moscow. [redacted]

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### Outlook

Despite Syria's growing military dependence on the USSR, Assad is likely to try to retain his political independence on issues that he deems vital to Syrian national interests. He probably still believes only the US has the leverage with Israel to bring about a peace settlement. Although Assad is increasingly skeptical of Washington's intent to pursue this goal, he remains open to US demarches on Lebanon and possibly on the peace process.

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The heightened Soviet involvement in Syria's defenses could become a sore point between Moscow and Damascus.

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[redacted] An increased Soviet involvement in Syrian military decisionmaking also would be likely to lead to disputes, as occurred between Moscow and Cairo in the early 1970s. [redacted]

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The deployment of the SA-5 units implies the Soviets will use them against an Israeli attack on Syria. Available evidence, however, suggests the Syrians have been unable to obtain a firm Soviet commitment. Moscow probably would not want to use the SA-5s in a small-scale clash limited to Lebanon, but the Soviets would come under strong Syrian pressure to do so. [redacted]

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